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Personal space and self-boundary are, respectively, sociological and intra- 
psychological concepts that refer to a complex of behavioral and subjective events 
between and within individuals. While there are large bodies of literature con- 
cerned with each of these concepts, literature that cuts across many disciplines of 
study, there has never been an integration of these concepts around specific 
human developmental issues. The present article focuses upon human infancy as a 
period in which both personal space and self-boundary phenomena can be ob- 
served. Developmental links between personal space and self-boundary 
phenomena in infancy and adulthood are outlined and discussed. 
The importance of spatial and territorial factors in human social be- 
havior has been well established by numerous observational and experi- 
mental studies in ethology, anthropology, sociology, and psychology. 
Personal space, one central component of spatial and territorial factors in 
general, has been studied frequently. A number of reviews of the litera- 
ture concerned with personal space, as well as the high number of studies 
of the phenomenon that are cited in Psychological Abstracts, indicate the 
value of the concept to behavior scientists (see, for example, Baldassare, 
1978; Edney, 1974; Evans & Howard, 1973; Hayduck, 1978; Pederson & 
Shears, 1973; Sundstrom & Altman, 1976). These reviews have variously 
focused on its normative aspects within and between cultures, its relation 
to various demographic variables, its basis in communication and social 
interaction, and its methodological and theoretical problems. Beyond 
these reviews, well-known treatments of the topic of personal space are 
works by Argyle (1975), Ashcraft and Sheflen (1976), Goffman (1970, 
Hall (1966), Sommer (1959, 1969), and Watson (1970). 
With few exceptions, authorities have regarded the concept of personal 
space as a quasi-discrete and circumscribable entity that regulates to 
some extent the individual’s transactions with others. As such it is an 
integral component of the individual’s representation of self and sense of 
subjectivity (see, for example, Goffman, 1963; 1971; Lewin, 1936). Per- 
sonal space differs from territory in that it accompanies the individual’s 
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movements. The actual size or extent of personal space varies according 
to various dimensions of social interaction (e.g., personal attraction) and 
subject-environment states (see Baldassare, 1978; Pederson & Shears, 
1973). Thus, Burgoon and Jones (1976) synthesized a definition of per- 
sonal space as follows: 
The invisible volume of space that surrounds an individual [;I an invisible. 
dynamic and transportable space the site of which is governed by the individual’s 
felt need at any point in time. (p. 131) 
The function of personal space has been the subject of several theoreti- 
cal speculations (see Evans & Howard, 1973). Pertinent to the present 
study are Altman’s (1979), Hall’s (1964, 1966), Sommer’s (1959), and 
Goffman’s (1971) views that personal space functions in a regulatory and 
protective fashion in the individual’s relations with others. Altman em- 
phasized the importance of privacy. Hall likened personal space to a 
protective “bubble” surrounding the individual. Goffman linked personal 
space directly to the self and its social interactional vicissitudes. Sommer 
specified four defining characteristics of personal space: It is portable; its 
geographic and psychological center is the individual’s body; it is demar- 
cated from the rest of the environment by invisible boundaries; intrusion 
into it by others arouses discomfort, causing the individual to withdraw. 
To these four defining characteristics I add two more. Based on various 
studies of ego and body boundaries, the size of an individual’s personal 
space fluctuates according to varying social, psychological, and organis- 
mic conditions (e.g., Blatt & Wild, 1976; Federn, 1952: Fisher & Cleve- 
land, 1968; Fredericks, 1969; Freeman, 1958; Goffman, 1971; Hayduck, 
1978; Mallenby, 1974; Perkins-Karniski, 1978; Sanders, 1978; Schilder, 
1934; Weinstein, 1969; Weiss, 1960), and they are semipermeable ac- 
cording to the degree of intimacy existing between the interactants. Fi- 
nally, personal space behavior is a key element of communication about 
the self. 
The psychological counterpart of personal space behavior is the self- 
boundary structure within the system of mental representations of body, 
social roles, and other categories of the self. Formulations concerning the 
functional significance of self-boundaries are quite similar to those made 
concerning personal space, especially with respect to their protective and 
mobile nature. For example, Fisher and Cleveland (1968) have stated that 
the body-image boundary, a particular component of self-boundary sys- 
tem, 
is a screen which [the individual] interposes between himself and outer situations 
and which he can carry with him at all times Thus the boundary may be 
conceptualized as playing an important role in maintaining homeostasis in the 
course of the individual’s psychological transactions with the world. It is a projec- 
tion of certain assumptions about life to an area of behavioral space which sepa- 
rates the individual from what is ” out there.” (1968, pp. 354-3551. 
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Reviews of boundary phenomena in general and self-boundaries in partic- 
ular have been made by Blatt and Wild (1976), Landis (1970), and Fisher 
and Cleveland (1968) (see also Fisher, 1970). These authors trace the 
development of self-boundary concepts in psychoanalysis and social psy- 
chology. While none of these reviews fully covers the neurophysiological 
and clinical neurological material that might be brought to bear on the 
subject (see, for example, Mettler, 1962; Popper & Eccles, 1977), it is 
clear enough from the reviews that the subject matter of self-boundaries 
and related behavioral phenomena cuts across several distinct disciplines 
of study. As such, it offers points of cross-disciplinary integration of 
theory that are at the foundation of this presentation.’ The concepts of 
personal space and self-boundary are, respectively, social-behavioral 
and intrapsychic counterparts of the same phenomenon. 
In further considering the function of personal space, many theorists 
view as primary the subject’s need to develop internal models of expecta- 
tion regarding the other. Such expectation or contingency models allow 
the subject to gauge potential courses of interaction outcome (Altman, 
1971; Berger & Calabrese, 1975). According to Berger and Calabrese 
(1973, the interactants’ “primary concern is one of uncertainty reduction 
or increasing predictability about the behavior of both themselves and 
others in the interaction” (p. 100). Goffman (1971) has charted a number 
of distinct categories of social organization (“preserves”) existing within 
social encounters. These include personal space, stalls, use space, turn 
taking, possession territory, and information and conversational pre- 
serves. The boundaries of these preserves are signaled to others by an 
array of physical and symbolic markers. According to Goffman, the pro- 
totypical territorial offense is the intrusion of one individual into another’s 
I Basically, the reader needs to begin from the premise that the person’s sense of self and 
its interpersonal correlate, identity, evolve within a social context that is constantly 
mediated by information processing structures within and under the regulation of central 
nervous system centers. The self, constituting an interface between the social-physical 
milieu and the underlying neurophysiological processes, is constructed by the converging 
forces of processes operating, to use Miller’s (1965) general systems terminology, at levels of 
matter-energy and information transmission. To paraphrase a point made by Rapaport 
(1967 [1957]), it is through the self that the social environment exerts its control over the 
physiological substate, and it is by virtue of the self that physiological processes are given 
semiautonomy from the milieu. In the most specific and ultimate sense boundaries are 
defined by informational content allowing A/not A decisions to be made by information pro- 
cessing mechanisms of the mind. In the subjective domain one of the basic decision units is 
that of seMnot self. Self-boundaries function at a succession of levels varying from the purely 
neurosensorimotor (body image) to the most abstract of mental representations. Presum- 
ably, in accordance with general principles of epigenetic development (Werner, 1940), there 
is in development and maturation a progression that starts with the neurobehavioral core of 
functioning and ends with a more broadly elaborated, highly integrated apparatus that pro- 
cesses information at multiple levels of abstraction. 
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preserve without proper authorization (signaled or tacitly given). Or- 
dinarily, individuals who are strangers to each other follow societally 
patterned interaction routines (“rituals,” see Goffman, 1967) when en- 
countering each other. These encounters are often regulated by the inter- 
actants’ maintenance of certain degrees of anonymity (Goffman, 1971). 
Implied is a set of governing procedures designed either to maintain unfa- 
miliarity or to transform the encounter by controlled degrees to one of 
greater familiarity. It is Goffman’s special viewpoint, largely reflecting 
George Herbert Mead’s concepts, that in encounters and relationships the 
focused aim of the individual is to create appearances that allow the other 
to see him as “unalarming” to others, as being “safely disattendable” 
(1971). The control of aggression and, quite significantly, the appearance 
of aggression is fundamental to the relational paradigms that evolve in 
social encounters, and they are embedded within a communication 
framework that is mostly nonverbal, subtle, and symbolically retined. 
Needs for a sense of personal effectance and affirmation of one’s personal 
constructs may form other motivational frameworks by which to gauge 
interaction events (Duck, Miell, & Gaebler, 1980). 
Of the many methods that have been used to study personal space 
phenomena in humans, most have focused on various aspects of interper- 
sonal proximity and nonverbal interaction (e.g., gaze interaction). While 
self-report and projective devices have been employed for the purpose of 
studying the proximity variable, the most effective methods have been 
tional paradigms have included ongoing interactions (e.g., conversational 
distance) and spatial invasions (e.g., experimenter or his/her confederate 
moves close to an unsuspecting subject) (Sundstrom & Altman, 1976), 
and various “stop-distant” techniques (Hayduck, 1978) wherein the sub- 
ject stops the approaching experimenter at whatever point discomfort 
is aroused. Various studies have determined that the actual comfortable 
distance is determined by several factors, including age, gender, degree of 
acquaintance and friendship, personal attraction, cultural background, 
need for affiliation, and psychopathology. (See reviews by Evans & How- 
ard (1973), Hayduck (1978), Sundstrom & Altmann (1976).) 
Proximity behavior, simple as it is to describe and measure, reflects an 
extremely complex set of intrapsychic and social-interactional forces, 
most of which are hidden from direct review. Substantial individual dif- 
ferences in response style and personal spacing exist (Porter, Argyle, & 
Salter, 1970). Hypothesis and inferences concerning the nature or prox- 
imity behavior derive chiefly from introspective-intuitive efforts on the 
part of observers, comparisons of the behaviors and the self-expressions 
of individuals in varying degrees of proximity to each other, and specula- 
tions along established theoretical models of human social behavior. 
Nevertheless, studies of proximity behavior remain of considerable 
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heuristic value within the larger realm of social psychological theory and 
research, being “important opportunit(ies) to better understand the form 
and function of human social life” (Baldassare, 1978). 
The remainder of this presentation deals with the topic of personal 
space in infancy, specifically the first year of life. It takes as its starting 
point the infant’s capacity for negative reactions when confronted by 
strangers, a phenomenon that is typically obervable starting within the 
second 6 months of the first year. This presentation will show that nega- 
tive stranger reactions of infancy correspond directly to processes occurr- 
ing in adult social interactions with unfamiliar persons. The thesis of this 
essay will be that with the onset of the capacity for fearful or cautious 
stranger reactivity in infants there arise active (as opposed to reactive) 
behavioral processes that directly correspond to adulthood patterns of 
personal space behavior with respect to strangers. These processes are 
intrapsychically organized, entailing the formation of structures (ego or 
self-boundaries) within a developmental context where selfhood is in its 
earliest phases of development (see, variously, Lewis & Brooks-Gunn, 
1979; Mahler, Pine, & Bergman, 1975). 
Developmental studies of personal space phenomena over the course of 
childhood have not included infants. While some attention has been paid 
by social and developmental psychologists to evolving facets of personal 
space behavior, there are too few systematically derived data to suggest 
specific stages or steps toward personal space along the various devel- 
opmental lines of social interaction. From studies of kindergarten-aged 
children and older, many of which are nonbehavioral (i.e., projective 
doll/silhouette placing techniques) and therefore less preferable than be- 
havioral and direct observational methods (Hayduck, 1978; Mallenby, 
1974), it is evident that many of the factors (e.g., ethnic membership, 
gender, degree of prior acquaintanceships) that influence the size and 
penetrability of personal space in adulthood are operative during child- 
hood (see, for example, Aiello & Jones, 1971: Guardo, 1969; Ihara, 1978; 
Loo & Smetana, 1978; Meisels & Guardo, 1969; Pederson, 1973; Wein- 
stein, 1965). While some studies suggest that children’s social spacing 
assumes adult properties by 11- 12 years of age, more concrete and sys- 
tematically derived longitudinal data are needed. Interestingly, there 
seems to be a developmental progression in how the child is responded to 
when he/she invades the personal space of an adult. Younger children 
(age 5) tend to be reacted to by adults with facilitative behavior while 
older children (age 10) trend to be reacted to with avoidance or increases 
in motor activity, possibly anxious in nature (Dean, Willis, & IaRocco, 
1976). These findings are consistent with findings of adult studies that 
show that status and power factors influence personal space behavior. 
By way of examining the phenomenon of infant stranger reactivity from 
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the standpoint of the subject’s personal space the aim of the present 
article is to demonstrate the former’s pertinence to social-psychological 
study and thus to bring the topic more squarely into that domain. I shall 
sh! .w that stranger reactivity in infancy follows a developmental course 
that may well further the social psychologist’s understanding of the an- 
tecedents of personal space phenomena in adults. In order to achieve an 
integrative aim, I shall also briefly discuss theoretical relationships be- 
tween external events and psychological events that are possible if not 
likely concomitants of infants’ encounters with strangers. This discussion 
will center upon the reciprocal and obverse relationship between self- 
boundaries (intrapsychic) and personal space (transactional) structures. I 
intend to bring together empirical data and concepts from two hitherto 
unintegrated fields of study, aiming toward a synthesis that will enlarge 
the scope of observation and conceptualization about human interactions 
and interactive capabilities in the earliest phases of life. 
INFANT STRANGER REACTIVITY 
Space does not permit a comprehensive survey of literature concerning 
stranger reactivity in infants. Several detailed reviews of the topic obviate 
the necessity for one (Batter & Davidson, 1979; Decarie, 1974; Horner, 
1980; Harmon et al., 1977; Rheingold & Eckerman, 1973; Sroufe, 1977; 
see also Lewis & Rosenblum, 1974). However, some exposition of the 
principal findings and concepts that have emanated from the many em- 
pirical studies and theoretical treatments of the subject is required for 
background purposes. Much of what follows, then, is condensed from the 
review references just cited. The material that follows does include, how- 
ever, a considerable amount of information not covered in previous re- 
views of infant stranger wariness and fear. 
Until the 197Os, when, after Rheingold and Eckerman’s (1973) critique 
of the infant stranger reactivity research, there began to appear studies 
emphasizing both the positive as well as negative emotional components 
of stranger reactivity (e.g., Bretherton & Ainsworth, 1974; Corter, 1973; 
Eckerman & Rheingold, 1974; Eckerman & Whatley, 1975; Ross & 
Goldman, 1977; Bretherton, Stolberg, & Kreye, 1981), the psychological 
literature on stranger reactivity emphasized almost exclusively upon the 
anxious or fear component that appears somewhere around or shortly 
after the midpoint of the first year of life. Most theorists now assert that 
the period of development in which fear reactions to strangers arises is 
also a period in which positive affects and behaviors toward strangers 
continue to occur, even as they did in the period prior to the onset of fear 
reactivity. What is essentially different between the two developmental 
periods is not that stranger fear reactivity rrp1acc.s positive responses as 
the principal affective reaction (the classical view) but that fear emerges 
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as an affect capacity that expands the repertoire of behavioral and affec- 
tive expressions on the part of the infant (the new idea) (see Horner, 
1980). Thus, stranger fearfulness takes its place coexistent with positive 
reactive capacities. 
Developmental Course: Infancy and Beyond 
Studies of conditional responding in infancy have documented that 
from the second month onward there exist stable and progressively syn- 
thesized capacities for discriminative perception and differential re- 
sponding on the part of the infant (Brackbill & Koltsova, 1967; Kasatkin, 
1968; Kessen, Haith, & Salapatek, 1970; Reese & Lipsitt, 1970, Chaps. 
3-5). In its earliest days, long before its reactions to the stranger involve 
negative affect, the human infant is capable of making perceptual dis- 
criminations between mother and nonmother in several modalities in- 
cluding olfaction, audition, and vision (Carpenter, 1975; MacFarlane, 
1975; Roe, 1978; Turnure, 1971; Wolff, 1963). Differential responding to 
strangers is typically evident by about 3 months (Bayley, 1969; see also 
Ambrose, 1963; Barrera & Maurer, 1981a, 1981b; Dixon, Yogman, 
Tronick, Adamson, Als, & Brazelton, 1981; Fitzgerald, 1968; Thompson 
& Grusec, 1970.) In general, while young infants of 2 to 5 or 6 months can 
hardly be called sociable per se toward strangers, there is nevertheless a 
tractability with regard to the stranger’s presence and a positively toned 
response proclivity that exists in most infants in this age range. At about 
midyear, though, there arise what seem to be transitional phenomena, 
including states of serious alertness and attention toward the stranger 
(Brody & Axelrad, 1970, have called this “customs inspection”) as well 
as expressions of low-level discomfort (Escalona, 1968). 
The temporal onset and duration of stranger wariness and cautiousness 
are not difficult to sketch in broad terms. However, in accordance with all 
the variables that could be reasonably hypothesized to influence it, in- 
cluding those of temperament, the quality and quantity of the infant’s 
prior exposures to and experiences with strangers, and the infant’s qual- 
itative relationship with the mother (one of the primary functions of which 
is to facilitate the infant’s regulation of affectivity in general), the temporal 
course varies from infant to infant. Besides age, empirical studies have 
found a number of factors to be associated with whether or not and how 
much an infant reacts negatively to the appearance or approach of a 
stranger. They include the gender of the stranger (Brooks-Gunn & Lewis; 
Greenberg et al., 1973; Morgan & Ricciuti, 1969; Skarin, 1977), the age 
and physical features of the stranger (e.g., facial Gestalt, height) (Green- 
berg, Hillman, & Grice, 1973; Lewis & Brooks, 1974; Brooks & Lewis, 
1976; Weinraub & Putney, 1978), the degree of experience the infant has 
had with multiple caretakers (Blehar, 1974, 1977; Harmon, Morgan, & 
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Klein, 1977; Ricciuti, 1974; Stevens, 1971), and the infant’s level of irrita- 
bility in general (Harmon et al., 1977). 
One of the most conspicuous and perhaps central factors affecting 
stranger fear is the degree to which either the infant or stranger controls 
their encounters with one another. Studies emphasizing one or the other 
control dimension have been termed Infant-Controlled and Stranger- 
Controlled, respectively (Horner, 1980). All of the published longitudinal 
studies of infant stranger reactivity have employed a situation controlled 
by the stranger to elicit behavioral responses and emotional reactions. 
Thus, there is a bias on the part of these studies toward stimulating in- 
fants’ capacities for negative affect reactivity rather than facilitating their 
endowed or acquired capacities to mitigate it. These studies have shown 
large individual differences in onset of the stranger aversive capacity. 
While an occasional infant may exhibit the capacity as early as the second 
quarter of the first year, the majority of infants begin to exhibit it during 
the third or fourth quarters (Bronson, 1972; Campos, Emde, Caensbauer, 
& Henderson, 1975; Emde, Gaensbauer, & Harmon, 1976; Escalona, 
1968; Gaensbauer et al., 1979; Schaffer & Emerson, 1964; Tennes & 
Lamp], 1964; Waters, Matas, & Sroufe, 1975). Younger infants react more 
slowly than older infants to the stranger’s presence and approach (Bron- 
son, 1972, 1978). Institutionalization tends to delay the onset of the 
stranger fear capacity (Kagan, 1976; Provence & Lipton, 1962), and there 
are conflicting accounts as to whether multiple caregivers enhance or 
mitigate the capacity (Blehar, 1977; Caldwell, 1963; Ricciuti, 1974; Ste- 
vens, 1971; Tizard & Tizard, 1971). 
Even at ages where Stranger-Controlled studies demonstrate consider- 
able frequencies of negative stranger reactivity, Infant-Controlled studies 
(studies where the approach and regulation of distance between infant and 
stranger are in the control of the freely moving infant) have provided little 
evidence for a predominant status of fear in the 7- to 12-month-old infant 
(e.g., Bretherton & Ainsworth, 1974; Corter, 1973; Eckerman & Rhein- 
gold, 1974; Eckerman & Whatley, 1975). This does not mean, of course, 
that there are not some infants for whom this is the case. But the typical 
pattern under Infant-Controlled conditions seems to be one of two rela- 
tively distinct affective-behavioral systems-one exploratory and social 
in nature, the other wary-somewhat in competition with each other (see 
Ainsworth, Blehar, Waters, & Wall, 1978; Gaensbauer, Mrazek, & Emde, 
1979). 
Wary or cautious behavior toward unfamiliar agemutes seem to follow 
a developmental course that is slightly different from that characterizing 
behavior toward unfamiliar adults. Kagan, Kearsley, and Zelazo (1975) 
reported a developmental ascendence in behavioral inhibition and 
avoidance of unfamiliar peers that peaked at about 20 months. The inhib- 
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itory tendency was stronger in non-day-care children. Proximity seeking 
of the mother was still high (highest, in fact) at 29 months. While at least 
some of the observed inhibition and looking behavior on the part of these 
toddler-aged children was no doubt simply a manifestation of orienting 
and curiosity, the pervasive patterns Kagan et al. observed, coupled as 
they were with heightened mother-proximity behavior, are strongly 
suggestive of a developmentally continuing capacity to be wary of un- 
familiar persons. Whereas Kagan et al. averred that their data lent con- 
firming support to Shirley’s (1933) longitudinal observations of 25 young 
children, it is important to note that in at least one other study involving 
similarly aged infants this pattern has not been corroborated (Eckerman & 
Whatley, 1977).2 
In children beyond the second year of life, the specific variable of 
stranger reactivity is sometimes obscured by more global categories of 
social responsiveness, and many studies do not specifically address pro- 
cesses of acquaintanceship during the toddler years (e.g., Grief, 1977; 
Isaacs, 1933; Mueller & Brenner, 1977; Mueller & Lucas, 197.5; Parten, 
1932; Ralph, Thomas, Chess, & Korn, 1968; Reuter & Yunik, 1973; Shea, 
1981; Whiteside, Busch, & Horner, 1976). Individual case studies of 
toddler and preschool-aged children adapting to new situations and un- 
familiar persons suggest that patterns of individual variation are broad 
(Murphy, 1962). Many studies of toddlers’ and preschoolers’ interactions 
with children and adults have produced data that seem to show that 
preschool-aged children display a manner of dealing with unfamiliar fig- 
ures that is transitional between the infant pattern and adult pattern (Con- 
nolly & Smith, 1972; Maccoby & Feldman, 1972; Maudry & Nekula, 
1938; McGrew, 1972; Smith, 1974). Since these studies have not focused 
in detail upon the acquaintanceship process itself it is again impossible to 
delineate precisely the course of stranger reactivity during these years. 
Sociological and ethological studies of adult-adult (stranger) encoun- 
ters have defined patterns of behavior that, like those of the infant, effect 
either greater familiarization or dissociation. Perhaps the plainest evi- 
dence of stranger wariness and control derivatives in adult human inter- 
2 Other studies of peer interactions have been either quite vague about the presence or 
absence of a specific fear/wariness dimension vis-a-vis peers (Field, 1979; Mueller & Van- 
dell, 1978; Young & Lewis, 1978) or, being specific about its presence, uninformative of 
individual patterns of approach-avoidance with the unfamiliar peer (Bronson & Panky, 
1977). Of interest in the Bronson and Panky study, though, is their separation of wariness 
factors (predominantly inherent) from fear factors (predominantly acquired), a distinction 
that is of considerable value in the conceptualization of avoidance-aversive behavior in 
strange situations. The implication, of course, is that wariness as a trait is a function of 
neurophysiologicaVevolutionary predispositions, whereas fear traits develop as a function of 
noxious experiences. 
PERSONAL SPACE/HUMAN DEVELOPMENT 157 
personal behavior resides in interaction rituals between unfamiliar per- 
sons with respect to their respective zones of personal space (see intro- 
ductory section). Casual observations in natural behavior settings (e.g., 
elevators, bus stops, theater lobbies, study areas, public thoroughfares) 
typically reveal many behavioral (posture, gesture, vocalization-verbal- 
ization, etc.) and physical (clothing, objects, etc.) cues regulating space 
and interpersonal distance. (See Altman (1979) on privacy regulation.) 
The individual’s “appearance” and “manner” are central among these 
(Goffman, 1958). It is in this regard that the direct correspondence be- 
tween stranger reactivity and personal space phenomena is to be noted, 
and this will serve as a basis shortly for analyzing the developmental 
function of stranger wariness in infancy. 
Prrranleters of Stranger Wuriness in Infulncy 
According to reviews by Decarie (1974) and Emde et al. (1976), obser- 
vations of and commentary on stranger anxiety or fearfulness in infants 
date from the previous century. In the modern era considerations of the 
functional significance of stranger fear begin with Hebb’s (1946) theory of 
stimulus discrepancy and affect. Hebb’s propositions dealt with the or- 
ganism’s reactions to discrepancies between novel external stimuli and 
internal (mental) representations, reactions that were said to be fearful 
when the discrepancy goes beyond comfortable limits. Despite knotty 
difficulties establishing meaningful quantitative measures of discrepancy 
and novelty (Lewis & Brooks, 1974; Stone & Church, 1973), the stimulus 
discrepancy theory has remained an essential part of contemporary 
thinking about wariness and interest (both being part of the arousal sys- 
tem) in the face of stimulus discrepancy and novelty (Hunt, 1961; Kagan, 
1974; McCall & McGhee, 1977; Schaffer, 1966; Sroufe et al., 1974). McCall 
& McGhee (1977) have emphasized, for example, that internal states 
of subjective uncertainty frequently result in behavioral states of “mo- 
tivated inattention” (viz., Lacey, Kagan, Lacey, & Moss, 1963). They 
cite the familiar experience of seeing someone that one cannot place 
turning away to recall (sort through) past images and impressions, and 
then attending to the present stimulus to see if recognition takes place. 
Schaffer (1971, 1974) spoke to the same process when he postulated 
stimulus-memory comparisons made by infants in the face of unfamiliar 
adults. Schaffer contrasted stimulus-memory comparisons (percep- 
tual-cognitive matching) with stimulus-stimulus comparisons (per- 
cept-percept matching), linking the former with exploratory orientations 
to strangers and the latter with wary orientations. 
Another category of explanation concerns the infant’s emotional re- 
lationship with the caregiving environment, mainly the mother (or mother 
surrogate). Following Freud (1926), Spitz’s (1950; Spitz & Cobliner, 1965) 
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conception which took direct note of perceptual-cognitive discrepancy 
factors, explained stranger fear as a function of the infant’s experience of 
the mother as absent (lost) when the stranger is present. This point of 
view suffers greatly under the weight of evidence that indicates that 
short-term memory structures are sufficiently established during the de- 
velopmental phases under consideration such that any sense of actual loss 
by the infant is barely conceivable. Spitz also believed that the specific 
phase of stranger anxiety constitutes a major shift both in the infant’s 
relationship with its mother (toward a libidinal cathexis of her as whole 
object) and, as a consequence of this shift, its relationship with the social 
world beyond the mother. While this is quite plausible within the theoreti- 
cal guidelines governing Spitz’s thinking, this relationship has remained 
empirically undemonstrated. 
Ethologically oriented theorists (e.g., Bowlby, 1969; Eibl-Eibesfeldt, 
1980; Freedman, 1961; Gray, 1958; Szekely, 1954) have considered 
stranger fearfulness from the standpoint of innate defense reactions (flight 
mechanisms). Important to the problem under consideration, ethological 
interpretations have been based largely on observation of humans in natu- 
ral settings and comparative analogy with animal behavior. However, 
data derived from controlled experimentation with human infants have 
lent strong support to the interpretation that particular stimulus configu- 
rations such as the height and facial Gestalt characteristics of the stranger 
have releasing significance with respect to the infant’s behavioral turning 
from the stranger (Brooks & Lewis, 1976; Freedman, 1961; Trause, 1977). 
Ethologically derived attachment theory (Ainsworth et al., 1978; Bowlby, 
1969) forms the principal conceptual framework for viewing the infant’s 
negative stranger reactions as manifestations of inherent defense mecha- 
nisms that involve the caregiver or other attachment figures as “havens of 
safety” for the fear-aroused infant. 
Psychophysiological studies have generally supported the notion of a 
changing pattern of affective disposition toward unfamiliar persons during 
the first year of life. Campos et al. (1975; Campos, 1976) observed sub- 
stantial shifts in the pattern of heartrate acceleration-deceleration related 
to stranger situations in infants studied at 5 and 9 months. Whereas 
younger infants generally show patterns of deceleration while in the pres- 
ence of the stranger, suggesting a basic orientation to the stranger’s ap- 
pearance and presence (Graham & Clifton, 1966; Lacey & Lacey, 1970; 
Stechler & Carpenter, 1967), older infants show patterns of acceleration 
(suggesting a defensive reaction), especially during moments when the 
stranger drew close to the infant (inside 1 m). The accelerative response is 
magnified during the mother’s absence from the encounter. While heartrate 
measures of acceleration-deceleration alone present some interpretive 
difficulties-they correspond to a large variety of simultaneously and 
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sometimes divergent behavioral expressions of affect (Scat-r-Salapatek, 
1976)-the correspondence between changes in heartrate and behavioral 
experiences of avoidance and aversion on the one hand (acceleration) and 
alertness accompanied by behavioral wariness on the other (deceleration) 
is remarkably congruent in the Campos studies. 
Sroufe et al. (1974) adduced psychophysiological data from lo-month- 
olds’ stranger reactions that are corroborative of Campos’ findings. A 
greater degree of acceleration occurred in the laboratory (unfamiliar) en- 
vironment than was the case in the infant’s home. However, behavioral 
indices of negative reactivity were not congruent with the observed heart- 
rate accelerative tendencies shown by infants. Despite what appeared in 
these data to be considerably broad variations from infant to infant with 
respect to the magnitude of heartrate acceleration a general trend in the 
unfamiliar setting was evident: the closer the stranger came, the greater 
the accelerative tendency seemed to be. This was only partly the case in 
the home setting. Similar findings have been reported by Waters et al. 
(1975). 
The various treatments of stranger reactivity have generally em- 
phasized its phase characteristics-that is, its crescendo, peak, and de- 
cline in the second half of the first year of life. Indeed, longitudinal data 
cited earlier support this phasic picture, Yet, when one looks across the 
span of develpment from infancy to adulthood (at least insofar as the 
empirical literature will allow) it becomes apparent that the stranger fear 
capacity. which has its orzsc’t in the first year of life, is a lifelong phenome- 
non the expressions and control of which, but not its specific nature, 
undergo transformations commensurate with transformations along other 
lines of development.” 
s It is pertinent to refer to Erikson’s (1963) first epigenetic stage of development, the stage 
of “trust vs mistrust.” To most students of infancy, the main component of this polarity is 
the trust component. Indeed, in his two principal treatments of this epigenetic stage (1950, 
1963) Erikson stated nothing concerning the importance of the capcity to mistrust in the 
overall adaptive functioning of the human subject. Too little, it seems, has been considered 
with respect to the mistrust component. Certainly, with respect to the mother and all signifi- 
cant others in the social environment the expectation and desired outcome is that the infant’s 
capacity to trust will be nourished in order to furnish the developing self with a sense of 
rootedness and connectedness with human others. But there is also an important- 
indispensible, even-part played by the formation of a capacity to mistrust. In adulthood 
this capacity forms the nucleus of discernment in one’s social relationships and, in specific 
regard to strangers, a preparedness for negative encounters. These dual capacities are firmly 
anchored in the neurophysiological constitution of living organisms (see, for example, 
Schneirla, 1959, 1965), being manifest as simple attraction-withdrawal mechanisms in the 
lesser developed species. and as more complex interaction rituals in more highly evolved 
species. In species where aggression occurs, whether instinctually endowed or learned, the 
capacity to mistrust in the service of protection from potential predators/injurers is adaptive. 
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PERSONAL SPACE: ANOTHER PARAMETER 
It is now my purpose to examine an apparent relationship between the 
encounter distance between infant and stranger and the infant’s reaction 
to the stranger. Some of this has already been alluded to in the foregoing 
material. The reader should now recall the distinction that was made 
earlier between Infant-Controlled and Stranger-Controlled studies of in- 
fant-stranger encounters. Table 1 provides an overview of studies that 
have use Infant-Controlled methods of assessing stranger reactivity.4 
Of the 323 subjects studied in this fashion approximately 28% have 
approached the stranger, usually within 4 to 5 ft. Because of different 
data reporting practices it is unclear how close the infants actually have 
come in all instances. Nor is it possible to gauge fully the differing effects 
of varying interpersonal and toy configurations upon infant behavioral 
reactions. And even though the range of ages so studied most certainly 
indicates that differing locomotive abilities are represented throughout the 
sample, it is unlikely that very many infants included in the total survey in 
Table 1 (Le., the eight 8-month-olds in the Rheingold & Eckerman study) 
could not have crawled in the service of approach or avoidant motives. 
When physical contact with the stranger is examined it is obvious that a 
relatively small proportion (14%) of infants have brought themselves near 
enough to touch the stranger. A glance at the durations of contact time on 
the part of infants who have made such contacts, however, reveals that 
such instances have been, when reported, few and highly transient5 
In view of hypotheses set forth in an earlier review of infant stranger 
reactivity (Hornet+, 1980) it is quite unlikely that these infants, who with- 
out overt evidence of apprehension approached or made actual contact 
with the stranger, experienced much in the way of distress laden affective 
arousal. It is also not unlikely that motivational forces comprised of 
curiosity (Berlyne, 1960) and associated interests (Izard, 1971), coupled 
with what may be considered to be distinct capacities on the part of the 
infant to tolerate and master (via active, exploratory means) the negative 
affective components of the situation, brought about the approach be- 
haviors of the infants. We may presume that under such circumstances 
the infants perceptually and cognitively gauged the situation in a fashion 
analogous to hypothesis testing (Miller, Galanter, & Pribram, 1960; 
Kagan, 1972, 1974; Schaffer, 1974) and that the multiple systems of be- 
4 Stranger-Controlled studies are not tabulated because they are quite uniform in their 
procedures and essential findings with respect to personal space (see text). 
s Although we have not as yet quantified the data being acquired under Infant-Controlled 
conditions in our laboratory it is evidence that this pattern of limited affectively positive 
approaches toward and contact with the stranger also occurs in children in the second year 
of life. 
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havioral responses available to the infant (see Ainsworth et al., 1978; 
Stern, 1974a) were governed by such operating mechanisms. But based on 
the data depicted in Table 1 there appears to be a definite trend on the part 
of infants (who in Infant-Controlled circumstances are presumably free 
from the anxiety producing elements of Stranger-Controlled conditions) 
toward maintaining some distance between themselves and the stranger. 
While the exact distance cannot be stated precisely, it can be reasonably 
speculated from the existing data that this distance is somewhere on the 
order of one to a few feet. Without specifying actual distances, it is rea- 
sonable to suppose that there is a zone surrounding either the infant or 
stranger (probably both) that possesses some signaling characteristic or 
set of related characteristics which in turn influences the behavior of the 
infant vis-a-vis the stranger. 
Bretherton, Stolberg, and Kerye (1981) have recently reported Infant- 
Controlled findings from a study of 12-, 18-, and 24-month-olds under 
relatively extended (45 min) toy-present, mother-present, two-stranger- 
present conditions. The strangers were socially responsive but not in- 
itiating, using a 2.5ft distance measure of proximity. While they did not 
report wariness-fear findings, it is evident from their report that very little 
in the way of negative affect patterns occurred throughout the sample of 
infants studied. Over the three ages the average amount of proximity time 
(15-s intervals) ranged from 17.5 to 30.4 (n = 5) out of 180 possible such 
intervals. The amount of time spent in physical contact was much less. 
averaging 2.7 to 4.1 out of 180 possible intervals. There were no consis- 
tent trends in the temporal patterning of approaches toward the strangers 
except that at each successive interval of the observation sessions more of 
the infants had made their initial approaches to either of the strangers than 
in previous intervals. Incidentally, the degree of proximity between 
mother and strangers did not influence the rate of approach or contact 
between infants and the strangers. These authors concentrated their dis- 
cussion of these findings on the differential contextual variables of re- 
sponsive vs initiating stranger anxiety, but the possible mediating role 
played by personal space/self-boundary constructs could also be consid- 
ered. 
While under the Infant-Controlled conditions it is the geographic limit 
of infants’ spontaneous, curiosity-motivated behaviors that suggests such 
a zone, under Stranger-Controlled conditions it is the infant’s aversive 
behavior that suggests it. When data from Stranger-Controlled studies are 
perused it is evident that it is not the stranger’s uppeurmnce but the 
stranger’s upprouch that generally evokes negative affect in the infant. 
Moreover, it is a specific part of the approach that is evocative, that which 
entails the stranger’s movement into the immediate surrounding space of 








































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































164 THOMAS M. HORNER 
Morgan & Ricciuti, 1969; Tennes & Lampl, 1964) as well as physiologi- 
cally via heartrate measures (Campos, 1976; Sroufe et al., 1974; Waters et 
al., 1975). 
Personal space phenomena, then, are not difficult to locate in human 
infant behavior. The correspondence between infancy and adulthood with 
respect to empirical findings concerning stranger reactivity and personal 
space respectively is remarkably direct. Yet while there are substantial 
data to suggest the dynamic existence of personal space structures during 
the period of the first year of life, few have ever identified them as such. 
Campos et al. (1975; also Campos & Stenberg, 1981) and Horner (1980) 
have made passing references to the possibility that personal space factors 
play some part in the reactions of infants toward approaching strangers. 
According to Horner, 
When it is considered both that (1) a substantial majority of infants in Infant- 
Controlled studies have approached the stranger only up to a certain point short of 
physical contact, usually within four to tive feet, and that (2) the final steps of 
Stranger-Controlled encounters, during which the stranger has intruded upon the 
immediate space surrounding the infant and then establishes physical contact, have 
generally produced demonstrable crudescences of behavioral as well as physi- 
ological . . correlates of apprehension, it becomes apparent that some sort of 
critical distance or personal/self boundary factor may well be at work. (1980, 
p. 213) 
In day-to-day life adults seem intuitively to sense this. In a unique study 
of adult behavior around an infant Shaffron (1974) produced evidence that 
adults tend to maintain some interactive distance for a short time before 
invading the infant’s immediate surrounding space. 
The behavioral correlates of personal space seem quite similar in in- 
fancy and adulthood-only the degrees of response refinement and, of 
course, the subjective components that separate infancy from adulthood 
in general distinguish them. This leaves, then, the question of whether or 
not the behavioral phenotype that spans development in such a continu- 
ous manner is in any way anchored in a genotype that also functions 
continuously throughout development (see, for example, Kagan, 1969). 
This question in turn raises issues that lie on treacherous ground for the 
theoretician; issues, for example, that concern phenomenological compo- 
nents of infant behavior. Moreover, the reader must keep in mind 
that the behavioral resemblances existing between the behavior pat- 
terns of infants and adults within a given species-especially within 
humans where the developmental pathways from neonancy to maturity 
are so varied, complex, and open-can rarely be ascribed better than 
analogous status, to use an evolutionary term. In the case of the personal 
space phenomena I am considering the minuteness of resemblance (viz., 
Simpson, 1961)-that is, point to point correspondence between them- 
PERSONAL SPACE/HUMAN DEVELOPMENT 165 
that is required for what the evolutionist would call a homology must still 
be determined. Formal (that is, behavior-morphic) analysis of the 
stranger reactive patterns of humans across the span of development sug- 
gest that the homology may be there. We may at least consider a condition 
of what Hodos (1976) has termed behavioral homoplasy, defined as 
[blehaviors that are similar but that cannot be related to structures that can, in 
principle, be traced back through a genealogical series to a stipulated common 
ancestral precursor. (p. 159) 
In the present instance, comnum ancestral precursor must properly be 
replaced by common der~elopmental situation orfknction. To further use 
Hodos’ model, we might expect that to the extent that infant an adult 
stranger-reaction behavior patterns are similar in a hornplastic sense, the 
underlying process is one of convergencr-that is, one whereby environ- 
mental presses operate similarly to produce similar behavioral adapta- 
tions. (For further discussions of the problem of homology see Masterton, 
Hodos, & Jerison (1976).) 
THEORETICAL CONSIDERATIONS AND EMPIRICAL PATHWAYS 
With, then, the identification of possible personal space phenomena in 
human infancy it is reasonable to postulate that their onset signals a major 
shift in the organization of the infant’s experience of self. Far from being 
conscious in a literal manner of its self, the infant nonetheless acts as 
though it has a sense of self operating within the interpersonal context 
surrounding it.” While many of the infant’s behaviors during the midportion 
of the first year of life, including imitation, contingency play, social interac- 
tion play, and mirror play (see, for example, Call, 1968; Kleeman, 1967; 
ti I fully acknowledge that an infant actingrrs though it is governed by a motive state which 
resembles adult action referable to the same motive is no proof of its actually being ccrused 
by the same motive state. While this point is perhaps moot by virtue of its wide acceptance 
among behavioral scientists. in the service of creating a proper perspective for the specula- 
tions I wish to make, it perhaps still deserves this brief mention. The issue is further 
addressed by Kagan (1969) and, more recently, by Wohlwill(1980), both of whom formulate 
the issue in terms of homotypic versus heterotypic variations in behavior-motive constella- 
tions. Basically, they discuss the dilemmas that are encountered in establishing patterns of 
temporal continuity when it is known both that specific behaviors may serve different 
motive states and that specific motive states may be asociated with different behaviors over 
even relatively short periods of development. (See, for example, a pertinent application of 
this principle in comparisons of stranger activity behavior in infants across the first year of 
life (Bronson, 1974).) The gap between the abundant empirical data with respect to the 
interpersonal spatial behavior of infancy and adulthood is broad despite some interesting but 
incomplete data for intermediate periods of development (see below). Thus. I shall have to 
confine my speculations to a framework that regards, in evolutionary terms at least, the 
respective processes to be discussed as at best analogous rather than homologous (cf. von 
Cranach, 1972). 
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Lewis & Brooks-Gunn, 1979; Mahler et al., 1975; Stern, 1974b), are indi- 
cative of advances made in the domain of the self, the complex of be- 
haviors that are associated on the one hand with personal space and on 
the other hand with self-boundaries may herald a coalescence of self- 
representations that comprises the core of subjectivity around which will 
evolve higher order systems of affect, perception, and cognition. (See 
Trevarthen (1977) and Newson (1977) for further interesting and evocative 
theoretical considerations of early subjectivity.) Implied by this is a sub- 
jective state of self that is coherent (in an inchoate way) and distinct 
(representationally speaking) from the social world.’ Mahler et al. (1975) 
describe behavioral and emotional interactions between the infant and 
others (especially the mother) that connote the formation of a self- 
structure demarcated by self-boundaries. These include the pleasurable 
kinesthetic and tactile stimulations that are created through motor activity 
such as kicking and flailing, crawling, walking, and so forth; playful be- 
havioral interchanges centering upon the body and its parts (“This is my 
nose, where is your nose?” “pat-a-cake,” “so big,” etc.), and tactile 
encounters with objects through bumping, falling, play, etc.-all of which 
further augment body-self boundaries. Peek-a-boo play seems to be es- 
pecially important, serving what Mahler et al. believe to be 
’ The idea that prior to that point in development when the self is experienced as being 
distinct from others there is a phase in which the infant’s experiences of self and other are 
blended, confused, and symbiotically one, is central to psychoanalytic developmental psy- 
chology (e.g., Jacobson, 1964; Mahler, Bergman, & Pine, 1975) and the quasi- 
developmental psychology of Kohut (1977). As part of a general critique of psychoanalytic 
infant psychology Peterfreund (1978) brought the issue of the symbiotic unity of the self and 
object into question, citing it as one of the basic fallacies in psychoanalytic thinking con- 
cerning this period in development. Agreeing with this particular criticism of self psychol- 
ogy, I recommend a view of the pre-self-distinguished-from-object phase as one best defined 
in terms of the lack of unity of experience rather than in the terms of an undifferentiated 
structure of self-object. This, of course, is not to say that certain psychological and person- 
ality conditions are not organized within a psychodynamic framework wherein the distinc- 
tions made by the individual, between aspects of the self and the other are blurred (as, for 
example, in the case of some narcissistic characterological formations and certain borderline 
personality configurations where heavy degrees of projective identifications with others 
occur (see Kernberg, 1975; Masterson, 1981).) However, nothing in the theories concerning 
these clinical entities requires a postulation of symbiotic unity prior to the phase in which 
behavioral distinctions on the part of the infant between self and other can be observed. A 
better approach to conceptualization this earlier period, I believe, is provided by the con- 
structivist psychology of Piaget. Accordingly, the object can be viewed in terms of a mental 
representational system that is constructed to organize experience, and in which objects 
(others) become distinguished according to attributes discovered by the infant to be inde- 
pendent of its subjectivity and its intentionality (Horner, in preparation). It is important, 
therefore, to keep in mind that differentiation between self and object is not necessarily 
meant in the paper to connote a predifferentiation phase in human development entailing the 
experience of self and object as one. 
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a double purpose-to find mother, but also to be found by her. To be found by 
mother, to be seen by her (that is to say, mirrored by her) seems to build body self 
awareness which we must surmise from observation of the endless pleasure in this 
repetitive game. (1975, p. 221-222). 
These inferences parallel inferences drawn by Spitz and Cobliner (1965), 
who also tacitly linked stranger fear phenomena with “integration and 
structuration of the newly established ego [and] . . . its boundaries 
through action exchanges” (p. 163) with the object world. 
It is clear from the behavioral changes of the child that the ego has greatly 
changed from the rudimentary ego achieved at three months. It has developed a 
series of systems, like memory, perception, the thought processes, the faculty 
of judgment and ego apparatuses like the understanding of space, the social 
gesture, a little later the capacity for locomotion, all of which make the ego more 
effective, but also a more complex structure. We can say that now the ego [self] has 
come into its own. (Spitz, 1959, p. 42) 
These developments are echoed by those who have written more spe- 
cifically in terms of the infant’s evolving “competence.” Here the em- 
phasis is on the infant’s emerging capacity for feelings of efficacy (White, 
1959), argued by Goldberg (1977) and Duck, Miell, and Goebler (1980), 
respectively, to be a central mediating component of reciprocity in child- 
hood as well as adult social relationships. It entails the sense that system- 
atically discovered contingencies of one’s behavior exist in the world of 
social interchange (Levitt, 1979; Lewis & Goldberg, 1969; Watson, 1972) 
and actions on objects (Gunnar-Vongnechten, 1978; Piaget, 1952; White, 
1971, 1975). With the capacities to intend and to monitor contingency 
sequences that are developed during the first year the infant’s sense and 
mental representation of self expand rapidly, affecting significant devel- 
opments in communication patterns and language acquisition (Bruner, 
1975a, 1975b). As development proceeds, the child’s continual experience 
of the boundaries between self and other are the somewhat forceful basis 
of its gradual and slow progress away from egocentric thinking (Piaget, 
1929). 
Essential to competence are the cognitive factors underlying self-other 
distinctions. Based on empirical studies, Lewis and Brooks-Gunn (1979) 
have distinguished four phases of self-development in the first 2 years of 
life, two of which pertain to the period in which personal space and 
self-boundary phenomena arise. In the 3- to 8-month phase they describe a 
state of self wherein elaborate action-outcome pairings (or cognitions) 
parallel distinctions between self and other that is consolidated but fleet- 
ing for lack of a notion of permanence. In the 8- to IZmonth phase, 
however, they describe a process of consolidation of self-other distinc- 
tions that is entirely compatible with the idea that specific boundary rep- 
resentations come into effect as mediators of the personal space 
phenomena that make their appearance during this development period. 
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Two avenues of investigatory activity are both suggested by and crucial 
to the validation of the considerations that have been made to this point. 
The first avenue entails further descriptions and experimental manipula- 
tions of personal space factors in infants, and points toward establishing 
personal space as a significant mediating variable in infant behavior and, 
presumably, emotional expression. It also directs attention toward the 
relationships between personal space as a social developmental milestone 
and other established milestones (e.g., social smiling, stranger reactivity, 
peer interaction). The second avenue entails the use of refined behavioral 
methods to make systematic comparisons of personal space behavior over 
the course of development, and points toward the possibility of estab- 
lishing personal space as a significant area of continuity in life. The rele- 
vant vehicle of travel along these avenues is, of course, the variable of 
proximity that is sought, maintained, or avoided by the child in its in- 
teractions and contacts with others. This variable is a familiar one in 
developmental research, particularly that which is ethologically focused. 
Social-demographic and psychological factors associated with this vari- 
ability (e.g., gender, familiarity, status, aggressivity) are important 
covariates to consider. 
Questions of immediate interest concern primarily the dynamics of per- 
sonal space within larger situational (see, for example Endler, 1977; Mag- 
nusson, 1981; Mischel, 1973; Volkert, 1951) and emotional (Sorce & 
Emde, 1981; Sroufe, Waters, & Matas, 1974) contexts as well as the 
functions of personal space in various situations (e.g., its impact on the 
shape of situations (see Snyder, 1981).) 
In the author’s own research activities a series of studies is about to be 
commenced which will examine certain aspects of personal space be- 
havior in parent-infant dyads in strange situations (laboratory), including 
intrusions made by the parent or stranger during structured and unstruc- 
tured interactions. These studies will also focus on antecedents of per- 
sonal space behavior. The stranger reactivity studies that have been in- 
cluded in this essay bear many implications for more detailed study (both 
naturalistic and manipulatory) of personal space. Many of these pertain to 
questions of immediate interest: How does personal space fluctuate with, 
for example, parental availability, prior to experience with others, the 
child’s familiarity with the environment, the specific behaviors of others? 
Organizational and ecological questions are ready to be addressed. For ex- 
ample, how do others treat the personal space of the infant. (See, in this light, 
preach styles of 15 adults who were meeting a single infant for the first 
time. This study showed that most adults do in fact show a regard for what 
can be presumed to be the personal space of the infant). As others’ be- 
haviors towards the infant begin to reflect a regard for its personal space, 
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what are the correlates in the infant’s own reactivity to intrusions and, on 
the other side of the coin, in the infant’s movements in the presence of 
others? Are home, day-care, and laboratory environments constructed in 
ways that acknowledge or presume the existence of personal space fac- 
tors in infants and young children? 
Clearly, there is a phenomena of personal space originating in infancy. 
It is marked by the patterns of stranger reactivity that have been de- 
scribed. It seems safe to assert that the various patterns of stranger reac- 
tivity that can be observed at infancy and adulthood respectively belong 
to the same continuum of interpersonal responding and behavioral regu- 
lation. Considerations of personal space and self boundary formation in 
infancy from the separate perspectives of the social-interactional and 
intrapsychic phenomena to which they refer substantially reinforce the 
utility and validity of these theoretical constructs. They are higher over- 
lapping in scope of behavior to which they refer. Yet they are distinct in 
the very different ways they refer to similar behavioral processes. To- 
gether they offer a framework for bringing together integratively two 
higher order domains of theory (sociological and intrapsychic) in ways 
that are too often overlooked or disregarded. 
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